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Don Cupitt’s version of religious non-realism based as it is on linguistic
constructivism, radical relativism and the view that culture forms human nature
has been attacked with devastating effect by realists in the last few years. I argue that
there is another strand in Cupitt’s thinking, his biological naturalism, that supports a
different version of religious non-realism and that he failed to see this possibility
because of his global non-realism and commitment to the strong programme in the
sociology of scientific knowledge. Cupitt’s biological naturalism should have led
smoothly into evolutionary psychology, which has an account of religious belief that
supports a non-realist interpretation. Evolutionary psychology shows that religious
beliefs are natural, normal and about matters of the deepest significance to humans.
They gain their character from the operation of evolved structures of the mind and
cannot be reduced to other sorts of belief. I argue that the form of religious non-
realism that emerges from taking biological naturalism seriously has a future because
it respects the nature of religious belief and seeks to build on its capacity as a unique
source of meaning in people’s lives. There is also enough common ground with
religious realism for there to be genuine dialogue between the two.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most people interested in religious non-realism associate the term with
Don Cupitt who has an extensive popular following that has spawned a
movement, Sea of Faith, dedicated to exploring radical non-realist
alternatives to orthodox realist Christianity. The debate between realists
and non-realists with respect to religious beliefs is about whether religious
claims should be interpreted – in accordance with their ‘surface structure’
– as assertions about aspects of ‘mind-independent’ reality, or whether
they should be interpreted as playing some other role (for example, as
assertions about a ‘socially constructed’ mythic realm, or even as direct
expressions of a community’s most fundamental values). Cupitt has
consistently advocated versions of the latter interpretation. There is no
doubt that Cupitt tapped into a reservoir of unease in the mainstream
denominations of Christianity in the 1980s and 1990s as people found it
increasingly difficult to assent to some of the supernatural aspects of
religious beliefs. These were people who still had strong religious
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commitments, who saw the value of Christianity as Jesus lived it even as
they lost their belief in Jesus’ divinity. They sought to reform Christianity
rather than to leave it and Cupitt was their spokesman. From his early
efforts in Taking Leave of God1 to formulate an intellectually satisfactory
alternative to religious realism until the present day he has offered a
perspective on the debate between realists and non-realists that cannot be
ignored.
Unfortunately, Cupitt’s standing in the philosophical world is not high
and it has been easy for religious realists such as Byrne to offer excellent
and decisive arguments against the forms of non-realism he has
advocated in the past twenty-five years.2 Cupitt’s non-realism has always
been grounded in what he terms ‘culturalism’, the view that human
nature, religious beliefs and all social practices are infinitely malleable by
culture. Language is the means for shaping both how the world appears
to people and, more extremely, how the world actually is. His culturalism
makes him a radical relativist, an advocate of the strong programme in
the sociology of scientific knowledge and an ardent post-modernist.
These are all difficult positions to defend and I do not seek to do so.
According to Byrne, Cupitt holds the view that language is not just a
truth-bearer but also a truth-maker. He argues that the world has no
determinate features until these are created by language. Statements do
not merely report a state of affairs that obtains; they bring it about. Byrne
regards that position as requiring an appeal to magic.3 If religious non-
realism could be supported only by such an approach then it would be in
desperate trouble.
There is, however, another element to Cupitt’s thinking that his
commitment to culturalism obscures and that shows considerable
promise for developing into an alternative basis for religious non-realism.
That is the strand of thinking that Cupitt labels biological naturalism.
Cupitt’s background in biology made him aware early on in his work that
evolution played a vital role in the construction of human psychology and
in the existence of the linguistic capacity to which he attributes so much.
He recognized early that as biological organisms humans had a unique
perspective on the world that they could not transcend – except, he
thought, through culture. But that exception brings out the crux of the
problem. The culturalism that Cupitt argues is a causal force shaping
thought and reality cannot bear the weight he puts on it. Much of what he
attributes to culture turns out to belong to biology. Cupitt keeps culture
as the dominant causal force and biology in a subordinate role with
barely any causal power when he should almost reverse their respective
positions. In the following sections I shall disentangle the biology from
Cupitt’s culturalist framework and show how it is possible to maintain
religious non-realism as a live option for the interpretation of religious
belief using insights from developments in evolutionary biology and
psychology. In doing so I shall show that, in addition to the philosophical
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problems Byrne has identified, Cupitt has simply fallen into errors of fact
that fatally undermine his version of religious non-realism.
The first step is to examine the relationship between culture and
biology as Cupitt understands it and then provide an account of how
developments in evolutionary psychology have led to a quite different
interpretation of culture that is relevant to a more empirically robust
theory of religion. Then it is useful to explore the reasons for Cupitt’s
failure to realize the significance of evolutionary psychology for his own
work in order to understand more fully what is at stake for those
sympathetic to non-realism. With that background in place I shall then
show that the strand in Cupitt’s work labelled biological naturalism is
best given content by evolutionary psychology and how it is possible to
restore religious non-realism as an alternative to religious realism by
giving it a biological base. It is particularly important to note that the
version of non-realism supported by evolutionary psychology recognizes
the normality of religious beliefs and their significance in human life. At
the very least that opens up the possibility of a fruitful conversation
between religious realists and religious non-realists.
II. CULTURALISM AND BIOLOGY
Until the early 1990s in the social sciences, culture was generally seen as
an independent causal force in shaping human nature and the content, if
not the structure, of the humanmind. By culture most theorists, including
Cupitt, meant transmitted culture, that which is passed vertically from
generation to generation or horizontally within generations. Everything
from food technology to folklore can be transmitted. Fashions, songs and
slang spread rapidly through the population and generally the stock of
cultural representations available to people is very large. It is easy to think
that the culture available to people contributes to their identity, making
them distinct from people in other cultures. Theorists of religion who
correctly regard religion as a cultural product have also naturally
assumed that culture has causal properties in determining what sort of
person an individual will become in any particular society. Biology in this
model, labelled by Tooby and Cosmides the ‘Standard Social Science
Model’, provides the body but very little of psychological importance.
The mind is seen as something close to a blank slate that is both written
on and organized by culture that is external to the individual.4 Cupitt, in
keeping with his radical approach, has always maintained a very
significant role for culture in the moulding of the individual. Indeed, it
is culture mediated by language that forms the basis of a cultural
relativism so strong that he regards members of different cultures as
seeing ‘different worlds’.5 In case his readers are tempted to think that he
means that metaphorically he later adds that culture forms ‘perceptual
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and cognitive capacities’ so that there are no purely biological responses
(Creation, p. 163). He claims, without any supporting evidence, that ‘even
the way our visual system works is subject to historical change’ (Creation,
p. 100).
Emotions are, in Cupitt’s view, similarly culturally determined. They
are created by stories, constructed in language and can be identified only
to the extent that they can be described. ‘Cultural codes’ produce
emotions.6 Even human sexuality is a ‘cultural fiction’ (Story, p. 155).
Biology provides something of an amorphous blob that has to be worked
into shape by culture and language. It has few determinate features
independent of the modification undertaken by culture. Cupitt claims
that ‘. . . there is no purely biological level of life, prior to its expression
in the sign’ (Creation, p. 98) and that ‘the cultural has grown bigger
and bigger while the natural has grown smaller and smaller’.7 For
Cupitt it is obvious that perceptual, cognitive and emotional
systems cannot function without the operation of culture on them. It is
equally clear to him that what is perceived, thought and felt is
determined by the historical setting and geographical location of the
individual. There is nothing significant about human nature that is
universally shared by way of a common biology. Cupitt rests his entire
case for religious non-realism on the fact of culturalism, which is
unfortunate given the robust evidence available now for a somewhat
reduced role for culture in the making of a human being and a greatly
enlarged one for biology.
Cupitt’s line of reasoning is this: if culturalism is true then the human
mind and human nature are extensively malleable and all cultural
products can be changed. Religious belief is a cultural product so it too
can be changed and it can be changed radically because culture, as an
independent causal force, is capable of bringing about whatever radical
change people choose. (Cupitt is primarily interested in what reforms
people should explicitly select). Religious belief is wholly contingent on
the historical conditions obtaining at the time and now that conditions
have changed we (Cupitt uses the personal pronoun a great deal) should
change our out of date religious beliefs in a divine order and supernatural
beings. Byrne correctly identifies Cupitt as a global non-realist who
consistently rejects realist interpretations of any domain of discourse.8
His religious non-realism appears to be a form of expressivism about
human values.
However, the work of evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists
such as Boyer, Sperber, Barrett, Tooby and Cosmides shows that there
are good reasons for rejecting the idea that the various evolved features of
the mind have minimal influence on the formation of culture and cultural
products such as religious beliefs. I shall now examine this work in more
detail and show how it affects the possibilities for interpreting religious
belief.
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III. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
In the early 1980s Cupitt was right to shun the work of evolutionary
psychologists who were still in the grip of an over-enthusiastic socio-
biology that claimed far too much, replaced cultural determinism with
biological determinism and had only the most tenuous connection to
experimental evidence. By the mid-1990s, however, the situation had
changed considerably and evolutionary psychology had developed into
an evidence-based discipline, integrated with the biological sciences and
drawing extensively on work in cognitive science. The picture of the
human mind that has emerged since then is one of a rich culture-
generating mechanism comprised largely of specialized modules that
evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. Instead of being a ‘blank
slate’ the mind/brain consists largely of evolved domain-specific modules
that process information and generate representations about particular
problems.9 The operation of these modules is inaccessible to conscious-
ness though the results are often available for conscious considera-
tion. They work automatically and very swiftly to produce intuitive
representations about, for example, persons, artefacts, other minds or the
physical world. At some level, still the subject of debate, integration of the
modules’ outputs occur so that the individual can form complex beliefs
about the world without having to do so consciously.10 Conscious
thinking is extremely valuable and adaptive in many ways but it is slow
and error-prone so that if everything had to be worked out consciously
humans would not survive. Similarly, if human children had to learn
everything they needed to know about the world they would not be able
to function. Instead they have significant cognitive architecture before
they acquire language or culture that enables them, for instance, to make
inferences about the properties of solid objects, recognize faces and then
rapidly develop sophisticated skills in their early years such as the ability
to attribute beliefs and desires to other persons. Persons are so significant
in adaptive problems that a large proportion of the systems are dedicated
to representing agents.11
These modules have content that is best understood as providing a
template so that when a small piece of information activates a module
many implicit expectations about that category are triggered to form
complete representations. This is important because cultural transmission
is quite sparse. Most of what a person needs to know is not actually part
of what is transmitted by other people. So, for example, when a child finds
out that cats are animals she does not have to be told all the information
people take for granted such as that a cat moves by itself and cannot
change into something else. When she learns that an object is a spanner
she does not have to be told (and is unlikely to be told) that it cannot
move by itself. She also knows that it can cease to be a spanner if its
properties are altered.12
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Biology enables culture to arise and it also constrains the content of
that culture according to the structures of the mind. So, for example,
humans are highly responsive to stimuli suggesting the presence of other
agents. Because it is adaptive to be over-responsive to agency rather than
under-responsive humans tend to posit agent-causes for natural
phenomena and to look for intentional rather than mechanistic
explanations of events. As Guthrie has put it, humans see faces in the
clouds.13 These tendencies are, thus, widely reflected in human cultures
across the world. They have direct implications for religious belief, as
I shall show.
Cupitt was wrong about the role of culture in sustaining perception,
cognition and emotion. These functions are present in working order
before a child has any language and a rudimentary sense of self precedes
language. His reliance on language and consciousness is undermined by
the emerging view of the specialized mind and also by studies from
neuropathology that show the independence of consciousness and
language. Adults with various, sometimes profound, linguistic impair-
ments from illness or injury show no impairment of consciousness
suggesting that the biological sources of consciousness are not connected
to language abilities.14 More significantly, Cupitt could not account for
the skill with which languageless adults, often those who were born deaf
and never had the chance to acquire sign language, find their way about
the world. Although these people struggle with abstraction their
consciousness is intact and they can perform an impressive range of
cognitive tasks.15
The most interesting feature of the work in evolutionary psychology
for the purposes of this paper is the evidence showing that religious beliefs
in supernatural agents follow similarly universal patterns. As a species
humans tend to over-populate the world with agents, as I have already
mentioned, and some of the most salient of agent concepts are those that
are usually labelled religious. A salient concept is one that is memorable
and likely to spread easily. Boyer argues that religious concepts arise as a
by-product of the operation of cognitive modules that evolved to do other
things. The agency and animacy systems are activated but so are the
social exchange mechanism, intuitive morality and sometimes the
contagion module. That means that religious concepts tend to be about
persons who are self-motivating, able to engage in social contracts with
others involving exchange for mutual benefit and who have a particular
interest in the moral concerns of the believers. The contagion module,
which usually functions to prevent contact with dangerous substances
such as decaying carcasses, is the source of religious notions of pollution
and purity. The most successful representations are those that generate
the most inferences for the least cognitive effort. That is, given a small
amount of information from the outside an individual comes up
with the most complete representation possible that solves the problem
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without conscious construction. Successful religious concepts tend to
be those that have many or all of the features listed above and can
be used as explanations of such things as misfortunes befalling
individuals.16
Religious concepts are successful because they activate a range of
modules producing intuitively plausible representations about matters
that are socially important. They are part of a range of supernatural
concepts such as ghosts or aliens that are universally found but they are
distinguished by the fact that they matter deeply to people. They have an
emotional component that other supernatural concepts lack.17 Sponta-
neously generated religious concepts contain at least one counter-
intuitive element. By counter-intuitive Boyer means something that
contradicts the expectations that go with the object’s ontological
category. God, gods, spirits and ancestors fit the person-template, which
means that people will automatically expect them to be able to do all that
things that persons do such as enter into mutually beneficial social
exchange arrangements, know all the things that a person knows, be
interested in what persons are interested in and be limited in the way that
persons are limited. Religious concepts are made salient by having an
extra ‘tag’ to them, which represents a specific violation of a small number
of those intuitive expectations. Too many violations would make the
concept cognitively inefficient because they are too difficult to remember
and work with; too few would make it lose salience. God is memorable
because he is treated as a person but unlike other persons he can be
everywhere at once. (Persons normally have a spatio-temporal location.)
Because the concept of God activates the person template he is
automatically taken to have intentions, an interest in the concerns
of humans, a view on moral matters and an ability to enter into
agreements.18
Not only persons can be sacred. Artefacts can become salient religious
objects by having person-like characteristics attributed to them. Statues
that can hear, think and respond to requests are not uncommon religious
concepts.19
These recent developments in biological psychology do not establish
a case for biological or genetic determinism – anathema to most
evolutionary biologists and psychologists because they crudely misrepre-
sent the complex interaction between nature and the environment – but
do show that the human mind consists of an immensely sophisticated
set of inference systems whose intricate workings enable every aspect of
human functioning. Most of what Cupitt would attribute to culture
is part of that biological function. Yet there remains the puzzle of
why Cupitt does not recognize the value of this work for his own project
since he is by far the most biologically literate philosopher of religion
among his contemporaries. It is worth looking at this anomaly in more
detail.
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IV. CUPITT AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Cupitt sets out his commitment to biological naturalism in The Last
Philosophy20 where he puts forward a biologically informed psychology.
There is considerable content to this psychology and it is Darwinian (or
post-Darwinian) in that it relies heavily on evolutionary theory. By 1995
the literature on evolutionary psychology was both large and credible but
Cupitt does not use it to refine his view of human psychology. He does not
ignore it entirely, however. He cites Dawkins, the biologist who has
popularized the notion of the ‘selfish gene’, and Pinker, whose work
on language plays a dominant role in the evolutionary psychology
programme.21 He dismisses them both because, as a non-realist, he rejects
their claim to have discovered something about the way the world works.
In his most anthropological work, After All, he uses the work of Mithen,
a palaeo-anthropologist who studies the evolutionary origins of
religion.22 Unfortunately Cupitt misinterprets him.
Cupitt views all contemporary anthropology through his culturalist,
global non-realist lens. Mithen is interested in the evolutionary origins of
the universal tendency to develop religious belief, which he believes can be
traced through the record of pre-historical human artefacts. His results
apply to all humans and the relevant change in the species occurs in
evolutionary time not historical time, between 30 000 and 60 000 years
ago.23 Cupitt is committed to the view that significant changes in human
nature – particularly human consciousness – occur during historical
epochs even though there is no evidence of evolutionary change in
humans in that timescale. Humans have the same minds now as they did
in palaeolithic times. It is then, at least in part, Cupitt’s culturalism that
obscures his view of the recent revolution in the biological sciences. For
him culture does all the work of transforming a rough and ready biology
into something distinctively human. It is difficult to see how culture could
be doing the work given that the capacity of the mind to support
particular cultural structures has to exist prior to the cultural phenomena
themselves. Cupitt has cultural change causing changes not just to the
content of human minds – a modest and reasonable claim – but to the
structure of the mind. In having the causal direction go from culture to
mind Cupitt creates a mystery about how culture ever gets going.
Mithen’s account of how the mind evolved to make religious representa-
tions possible fills the explanatory gap and reverses the causal direction
from mind to culture: once the cognitive capacity is present the forms
cultures take will of necessity be consistent with that biologically based
capacity.
A further problem is that Cupitt’s culturalism supports his global non-
realism so that any scientific advance in any field can be dismissed by him
as just another story about the world that is no more likely to be right
than any other. There is no independent external reality against which
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one can test one’s theories. He thinks scientists are profoundly mistaken
when they take their discoveries to be about the world as it really is.
Instead he advocates a position that fits with the strong programme in
the sociology of scientific knowledge; that is, the view that scientific
knowledge itself is socially constructed. This is not the trivially true claim
that sociological factors affect the course of scientific discovery but the
claim that the discoveries themselves have only social causes.
Evidence of Cupitt’s commitment to the strong programme within the
sociology of scientific knowledge is scattered throughout his work. He
claims that scientific theories are cultural products in a passage that
suggests that theories, moral judgements, sense-data, rational intuitions
and religious experiences are cultural products only (Creation, p. 26).
They are not about anything real. Science ‘privileges itself ’ but it is just a
‘cultural construction’ and scientists are revealed by the history of science
to be ‘cultural policemen’ (Creation, pp. 168–169). Cupitt’s view that
language creates rather than merely describes the world leads him to
reduce scientific observation to a literary activity that is to be regarded
with the utmost suspicion. Data are ‘hand-picked’ because of their
relationship to theory and they have been ‘acculturated’ because they can
be presented only in a system of signs. They are entirely textual so that ‘all
science is literary and social. It cannot pretend to be itself natural in the
sense of having a privileged and impartial standpoint outside language
and culture’ (Story, pp. 144–145). Of course, scientists have never claimed
to be operating outside language or culture but they have argued that the
results of their activity transcend language and culture and are true or
false independently of cultural beliefs. An examination of the evidence
put forward by sociologists of scientific knowledge actually shows the
opposite of what they claim. Far from being culturally conditioned,
science is robustly transcultural.24 But Cupitt requires science to be
disarmed so that he cannot be shown to be wrong. The result is that he
has entirely insulated himself from having to consider the possibility that
research in biology undermines his central claims about human nature.
If evolutionary psychology is right about the evolved structures of
the mind then Cupitt’s culturalist assumption that language and culture
create the mind is wrong. Rather, language and culture are biological
categories that are dependent on the biology of humans and play a
proximate causal role in the generation of the content of human culture
but not an ultimate independent one. That is, the reason why a person is
Catholic rather than Hindu may be explained by the cultural content of
her local environment. The reason there are religious beliefs in the culture
at all is due to specific features of the mind that make it possible for them
to occur. Cupitt did not see the potential in evolutionary psychology
and he attached religious non-realism to the soon to be discredited
culturalism. This is a great shame because his biological naturalism is
fundamentally right and if he had not covered it in layers of relativism
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and post-modernism he might have seen where it could lead. The
unfortunate result is that religious realists have been able to dismiss
the case for a non-realist interpretation of religious belief by disposing
of culturalism. In the next section I shall show how taking biological
naturalism seriously restores religious non-realism as a credible option
for the interpretation of religious belief.
V. BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Several points follow from accepting biological naturalism and taking it
to the conclusions about religion from which Cupitt was distracted by his
culturalism. A biological naturalist accepts that the human mind is the
product of evolution by natural selection and that the mind consists to a
large extent of perceptual and cognitive modules designed by natural
selection to solve adaptive problems, those that ultimately affect survival
and reproduction. As a vast number of adaptive problems facing humans
involve dealings with other humans, a large amount of cognitive
architecture is dedicated to representing agency, keeping track of
relationships and negotiating social exchanges for mutual benefit. These
capacities are universal among humans and only the content of the
representations changes according to culture. That is to say, humans
have, for the last 30 000–60 000 years, inhabited the same mental and
emotional world regardless of time and circumstance. Cultural differ-
ences are not structural. This universal structure of the mind both enables
and constrains the type of culture humans can have.
Religious beliefs are also found universally among humans. The
content varies but the pattern of beliefs is recurrent. That is, the same
sorts of religious beliefs appear over and over again in the anthro-
pological record. Given the potential for variety among religious beliefs,
which we might expect to find about absolutely anything we can imagine,
the record of the religious beliefs that people actually have is oddly
narrow.25 They tend to be about supernatural agents who interact with
people. They include rituals surrounding the most important aspects of
life: birth, death and marriage. They contain representations of agent-
causes of suffering and misfortune.26 Most people have some religious
beliefs. And this recurrent pattern leads to the first point that the
biological naturalist can entertain: religious beliefs in supernatural agents
are natural. The biological naturalist can show that far from being a
symptom of psychopathology or immaturity religious belief is a normal
feature of human cognition. This finding is quite inconsistent with
Cupitt’s frequently repeated claim that ‘we’ cannot believe in these
entities any more (because we are so different from our ancestors) and
that it is a feature of mature adulthood to reject the needy, infantile
dependence on a superbeing that has characterized Christianity. Rowan
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Williams has pointed out the use of ‘we’ is ‘a claim to power and
legitimacy of a kind’.27 Now there is some empirical evidence to suggest
that Cupitt has misunderstood the nature of religious belief, not only in
assuming it to be a sign of immaturity and cowardice but in failing to
appreciate the function of its supernatural elements. That somewhat
undermines his implicit claim to legitimacy.
The second point is that it is difficult to hold religious beliefs. People in
the modern Western world are ambivalent about them. Cupitt is right to
note that. However, he is mistaken in thinking that our ancestors found it
easy to hold to religious beliefs. It has always been difficult to have
religious beliefs. As I have explained, they are inherently counter-intuitive
so are salient but always puzzling. Religious beliefs feel right to believers
because they trigger a number of modules that operate below the level of
consciousness whose job it is to produce the representations that make
the richest inferences. On that level religious beliefs work very well.
However, due to their essential counter-intuitive elements, conscious
contemplation of religious beliefs draws attention to their inconsistencies.
Bread and wine is still bread and wine at the same time it is meant to be
flesh and blood; pigs sacrificed to the ancestors are eaten by the people
doing the sacrifice not the ancestors.28 The result is ambivalence. Cupitt
seeks to resolve the difficulty by removing the counter-intuitive element
but does not realize that doing so changes religious belief into something
else.
Religious rituals are also subject to ambivalence because the way they
bring about their effects is opaque to participants and observers alike.
Paul and Sandi are married after the ceremony even though they were
recognized as a couple before it; boys who do not undergo tribal initiation
rites still grow into men but are not like the ones who did undergo them;
no one can quite explain how the ritual makes a difference or what that
difference is.29 It is not the case that twenty-first century Westerners have
become unable to hold beliefs that their less sophisticated ancestors held
without difficulty. That means that one of Cupitt’s central tenets is
contradicted by the evolutionary anthropological evidence. It is not the
case that religious belief is in radical need of reform because it has become
impossible to believe. Reform may be necessary and, to an extent,
possible but the criterion for revision of beliefs cannot be that they are
difficult to believe because that encompasses all religious beliefs.
The post-Cupittian biological naturalist is in the position of being able
to regard religious beliefs as benign or, at the very least, neutral because
they are a part of the normal operation of human psychology. They are
not delusional or in any other way pathological except in cases of mental
illness. The biological naturalist can also recognize the inherent difficulty
of holding religious beliefs though some people are more affected by this
problem than others. Only the question of interpretation remains. Is there
any constraint on how the biological naturalist may interpret religious
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belief? In the next section I shall explain that the answer to this question
is no.
VI. THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Dawkins, along with many other evolutionary biologists and psycholo-
gists, assumes that evolutionary theory shows that theism is false.30
However, the most it could show is that there is no evidence for the
existence of God (not that there is no God) and then the argument applies
only to certain conceptions of God that function as hypotheses about the
natural world. Dawkins can easily explode fundamentalist interpretations
of the creation stories but for theists who quite properly do not treat
religious beliefs as hypotheses or explanations of the natural world he has
a less adequate response.
Barrett, whose evolutionary psychology is very similar to Boyer’s,
regards the ease with which young children acquire the concept of God
as evidence for the existence of God.31 Unfortunately, children in
polytheistic cultures acquire polythesim with the same ease. Boyer
carefully does not comment on the truth or falsity of religious beliefs as he
does not think evolutionary psychology has anything to add about their
truth status.32 His work leaves open the possibility of a non-realist
interpretation as there is nothing in the theory that says religious beliefs
have to be regarded as referential. There is, however, rather a lot of work
required to show that non-realism is correct.
I argue that the theoretical developments in evolutionary psychology
since Cupitt began writing can support religious non-realism and that this
is the line Cupitt should have taken given that he claims to be a biological
naturalist. He should have abandoned the culturalism of his earlier work
once it became clear that the empirical foundations for it were unsound.
In its place there are robust findings that support the notion that religious
belief is a natural part of the human condition and that it is both normal
to have religious beliefs and difficult to have them because they are
counter-intuitive. Non-realists have always sought to preserve what is
good about religious beliefs and the psychology of religion suggests that
what is good about them is that they express deep features of human life,
the most socially important aspects of it, in ways that are not reducible to
anything else. Cupitt began with a desire to preserve the community’s
religious expressions but he did not realize that an essential element of
that expression is precisely those aspects of belief that are most difficult to
accept.
The non-realist does not have to take unjustified steps in either the
direction of atheism or of theism on the basis of evolutionary theory. It is
also possible to avoid the barrenness of agnosticism. The evidence from
evolutionary psychology supports the view that the capacity for religious
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belief is a by-product of the evolution of capacities to represent agency. If
modules are producing representations of the features of the world that
they evolved to represent there is a criterion for determining the truth or
falsity of those representations. That assumes that for the most part –
with some exceptions – the beliefs we hold as a result of the performance
of the proper function of evolved mechanisms are truth-tracking. There
are grounds for thinking that this is so.33 If, however, the modules are
producing other sorts of representations as well, such as religious beliefs,
that they did not evolve to represent then we have no grounds for
assuming that those representations track some feature of the world
external to ourselves. That creates a space for non-realism with respect
to religious beliefs. It is possible to argue that religious beliefs are not
truth-apt.
The attractions of a biologically based form of religious non-realism
are considerable. The evolutionary psychological account of religious
belief restores its respectability as a normal, if not entirely consistent, part
of human life and strengthens the claim that it is socially important and
irreducible.
The temptation to remove the inconsistencies in religious belief so that
people can more easily assent to it is a strong one but in the end futile as
consciously accepted revised beliefs have to compete with the operation
of unconscious inference systems that pay attention to what is salient and
generate representations that are essentially counter-intuitive. Removing
the anomalies removes what makes religious belief different from other
sorts of belief and also reduces the likelihood that people will pay
attention to it or base any form of communal activity on it. Non-realists,
however, can accept that ambivalence about religious belief is a normal
state and not something that has to be fixed by revising the beliefs. They
can remove the focus from whether religious beliefs are true to what
meanings they express. These meanings are inexhaustible as religious
belief draws on every facet of human functioning and remains ultimately
impenetrable. There is scope for a rich variety of useful interpretations
and for accepting that religious rituals can be profoundly expressive
without having to be entirely transparent.
A further advantage of a biologically based non-realism that takes
seriously the nature of religious belief is that it is in a better position for
dialogue with religious realists because it recognizes that realist
interpretations come naturally and should not be disparaged. There is
room for debate about the scope of non-realism and possible combina-
tions of realist and non-realist interpretations of religious beliefs. There is
also common ground between realists and non-realists when it comes to
the matter of reforming belief and practice because they share ethical
concerns. There is nothing in such a form of religious non-realism that
says ‘anything goes’. The criteria for acceptability of belief and practice
are ethical, as they often are for religious realists. Religious beliefs can to
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a degree be modified and have been by all believers. Not all the moves
have been ethically sound but many of the liberal positions in Christian
theology are ethically grounded. It is not the case that religious non-
realism occupies the high ground morally (contra Cupitt). For Christian
non-realists the Gospel remains the reference point for evaluating
practices as it does for realists. They both ask whether religious practices
and religiously based positions reflect the Gospel values at the heart of the
faith. Their answers may well be similar once Cupitt’s denigration of
religious belief has been removed.
Religious realists may well not like religious non-realism but they
should object to it on different grounds than they have in the past. I argue
that it is not so easily disposed of once the biological naturalist strand in
Cupitt is set apart from the culturalism and developed as I have begun to
do in this paper. At the very least it should now be taken seriously in a
continuing conversation between religious realists and non-realists.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this paper for a version of religious non-realism that
originates in a neglected aspect of Cupitt’s own work – neglected by him
as well as by the commentators. It is founded on a commitment to
evolutionary biology as it has developed into evolutionary psychology
and related disciplines. Not only does this new field offer an account of
the psychology of religious belief, it forms the basis for a non-realist
interpretation of religious belief that recognizes the importance of those
beliefs in human life and does not seek to reduce them to something other
than they are. A biologically based religious non-realism rejects the
discredited view of cultural causation of religious belief that lies at the
heart of Cupitt’s writing and does not require a commitment to global
non-realism. Most importantly it restores the respectability of religious
beliefs by showing that they are a normal part of human psychological
functioning. With that understanding in place it is possible to map out a
future for religious non-realism that does not fall into the trap of
despising religious belief (or believers). It is possible now to appreciate the
hold that religious realism has and to seek to work with realists rather
than against them.34
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